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The advent of microcredit nancing has remarkably improved access to credit for
the poor in many developing countries. Although several microcredit programs have
adopted the joint liability scheme, economic theory suggests that joint liability could
increase strategic default through contagion and free-riding. This paper aims at study-
ing the extent of free-riding and contagion in joint liability lending. By using data from
experimental repayment games conducted in Vietnam, with noisy signals that resemble
actual microcredit programs, we found that subjects were motivated to free-ride un-
der the joint liability scheme. While most empirical research in this area has focused
on the problem of contagion, our ndings point to the signicance of investigating
free-riding behavior under joint liability schemes. Analyses reveal that the free-riding
tendency may be led by the irresponsiveness of repayment and shouldering behavior
to the partner's seemingly strategic default in the previous round.
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1 Introduction
Microcredit nancing, or unsecured small loans, have remarkably improved access to credit
for the poor in developing countries since the last two decades. According to Microcredit
Summit Campaign (2013), as of 2011, 3,703 micronance institutions (MFIs) had succeeded
in reaching out to 195 million clients, 124 million of whom were among the poorest cate-
gory at the time of initial loan disbursement. Most MFIs sanction loans under the joint
liability scheme, whereby group members are jointly liable for loan repayment. This scheme
is believed to be an important factor for achieving high repayment rates. Economists have
theoretically proved that joint liability can solve the asymmetric information problem in
lending to the poor without collaterals.1
However, some MFIs departed from this widely used joint liability scheme over the last
decade. Randomized experiment by Gine and Karlan (2011) supports this trend by detecting
no dierence in repayment rates between joint liability centers and individual liability centers.
Through a framed eld experiment conducted in Vietnam, Kono (2013) nds that joint
liability does not reduce, and sometimes increases, strategic default and default rates. Recent
papers have provided evidence for contagion under joint liability in Mexico (Allen, 2012),
India (Breza, 2012), and Pakistan (Kurosaki and Khan, 2012). They have noted that a
borrower tends to choose the option of defaulting when other members in the same group are
likely to default. Joint liability requires other group members to shoulder for the defaulting
borrowers, discouraging them from repaying their own loans. Free-riding is the other, little-
studied and less-documented, incentive problem under joint liability. Since joint liability
makes it necessary for other members in the group to help defaulting members, a borrower
has the incentive to strategically default, expecting other members to shoulder for him/her.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the extent of contagion and free-riding. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the rst study to investigate both the problems of free-riding and
contagion associated with joint liability lending.2
To identify contagion and free-riding, we rely on predictions from the economic theory.
Contagion predicts less strategic default in cases where group members have higher income
as it lowers the chances of shouldering for partners. On the contrary, free-riding predicts
more strategic default in cases where the partners have higher income since it generates the
1See (Ghatak, 1999) for adverse selection, (Stiglitz, 1990) for moral hazard, and (Besley and Coate, 1995)
for strategic default.
2Gine and Karlan (2011) observed the combined eect of strategic default and moral hazard. In this
paper, we solely focus on the incentive for strategic default.
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belief that the partners have sucient money to shoulder for the defaulting borrower. We
use original data from our experimental repayment games conducted in the villages of central
Vietnam to examine repayment behavior in both cases.3 Without experimental games, it
will be dicult to capture free-riding behavior, especially in cases where shouldering of debts
occurs through informal transfers and precedes the repayment date.4
Villages in rural Vietnam are geographically small and characterized by strong close-
knit communities. Moreover, since joint liability requires strong social relationship among
group members, subjects collected from such villages would be an appropriate sample to
examine the behavior of microcredit clients. The games were played across a two-month
period in August{September 2008 in a non-anonymous manner to resemble real microcredit
settings where the group members know each other, thus, allowing them to utilize social
sanctions outside the games. To address ethical concerns that may arise from the experiments
negatively inuencing social relationships, we introduced noisy income signals so the subjects
could not perfectly know each other's decisions. Although we believe that this incomplete
information setting is an adequately realistic portrayal, it may also lead to free-riding under
individual liability. To account for this, we analyze repayment decisions under both joint
liability and individual liability, and investigate the extent of free-riding and strategic default
in both cases.
To make individual liability comparable with joint liability in cases where borrowers
share income shocks, we have adopted the repeated game framework where borrowers under
individual liability could also share income shocks. Incentives for repayment were given by
dynamic incentives, or contingent renewal, wherein access to further receipt of loans by a
borrower or group was subject to repayment of the current loan. Dynamic incentives play
a key role in maintaining high repayment rates in actual microcredit programs (Alexander-
Tedeschi, 2006; Gine, Goldberg, and Yang, 2012).
Our results were consistent with free-riding under joint liability with precise signals. Our
ndings reveal that imprecise partner signals do not aect repayment decision, implying
that the signals were not precise enough to be relied upon. We do not detect free-riding
under individual liability. Furthermore, under the precise signal treatment, subjects did not
3Kono (2013) also uses the same data to compare strategic default rates under various schemes but does
not focus on identifying contagion and free-riding behavior separately.
4Oo and Toth (forthcoming) provide another excellent example of using experimental games for economic
analysis. They manipulate the market condition in the games to investigate a social institution of punishment
as the cause of stagnancy of microenterprises.
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respond to the seeming tendency of strategic default, which might qualify free-riding as a
rational choice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a conceptual model de-
scribing the incentives for contagion and free-riding under joint liability. Section 3 describes
our experimental design. Section 4 explains our empirical methodology and Section 5 reports
the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
This section describes the repeated repayment game model used to clarify incentive problems
under joint liability and individual liability. To keep the argument simple, we assume per-
fect monitoring, wherein the borrowers can observe partner incomes. We consider a group
consisting of two risk-neutral borrowers, each with a loan comprising repayment amount B.5
Since our purpose is to present borrower incentives for free-riding and contagion under joint
liability, we do not consider lender decisions. Generally, lenders impose dierent interest
rates for individual and joint liability. However, focusing on this will complicate the exper-
imental setting, without contributing much to the argument on free-riding and contagion
under study. Hence, we chose to vary the lending liability scheme, holding everything else
xed.
The incentive for repayment is provided by contingent renewal: borrowers can access
future loans subject to repayment of current loans. Under individual liability, borrower
i = 1; 2 is eligible to receive further loans only if borrower i repays amount B. Under joint
liability, borrower i can receive further loans only if the group repays amount 2B, irrespective
of i's own repayment record.6 The discount factor is denoted by . We normalize the utility of
not receiving loans (and thus, no investment) to be zero. There are no strategic interactions
5In this paper, we briey introduce the results; for complete characterization of the model, you may
refer to Kono (2013), who compares the frequency of strategic default under various schemes using the same
experimental data.
6We restrict our study to simple joint liability and ignore the possibility of designing optimal joint liability
contracts. Recent studies show the possibility of improving joint liability contracts by introducing partial
joint liability. See Bhole and Ogden (2010) and Allen (2012), which may explain why some microcredit
programs do not impose strict joint liability. Generally, models allow future credit access to depend on the
repayment amount, in which case partial repayment would be observed in the equilibrium. Our analysis
restricts its attention to simple contract structure in which future credit access depends solely on repayment
of the due amount by the borrower or group. It should be noted that our results might not be directly
applicable to cases of exible joint liability contracts.
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among the borrowers outside the repayment games.7 Additionally, we assume that the
borrowers cannot save and hence, previous earnings cannot be used to repay the current
loan.
The investment funded by the loan generates a stochastic income gi 2 [0; g], which is i.i.d.
(independent and identically distributed) over the borrowers and periods. Borrower decisions
do not aect the realization of gi to exclude the moral hazard in investment. Borrowers only
decide whether and how much to repay, and whether and how much to contribute for helping
their partners.8
The timing of the stage game is as follows. After observing (g1; g2), the borrowers simul-
taneously decide their repayment amount ri, i = 1; 2, which are observed by both players.
If ri = rj = B, then the stage game is over and both borrowers receive another loan in the
next period. If ri = B but rj < B, j 6= i, then borrower i is asked whether she is willing to
shoulder the decit of j, B   rj. Under joint liability, borrower i cannot receive any more
loans unless she shoulders j's decit. Under individual liability, borrower i is eligible to
receive the next loan, irrespective of whether she shoulders j's decit or not. In such cases,
borrower j can receive further loans only if borrower i shoulders the decit. If ri; rj < B,
both borrowers default and are ineligible for further loans. We assume that the borrowers
cannot enter into binding contracts and hence, any arrangement among them should be self-
sustained by repeated interactions.9 We also assume E(g) < 2B to exclude the case where
a borrower always prefers repaying in spite of persistent defaults by her partner.
The assumption of perfect monitoring enables the borrowers to observe both (g1; g2) and
(r1; r2), and detect strategic default by partners. In cases where borrowers can only observe
the repayment decision, and not partner incomes, ascertaining whether a default is strategic
or not is based on inferences.
7This is a simplied and unrealistic assumption because borrowers in microcredit programs often live in
the same village or area. In the experiment, subjects made their decision to invest and repay face-to-face
and hence, could resort to some social sanctions outside the repayment games.
8Though our experimental procedure only requires borrowers to choose whether or not to shoulder their
partner's loans, for generalization, we describe a model in which borrowers choose the amount of shouldering.
9This self-sustained risk-sharing mechanism is more often observed in developing countries than devel-
oped countries where there is less dependence on informal risk-sharing mechanisms outside family networks
(Townsend, 1994). Knowledge of partner incomes or its signal with high precision also makes risk-sharing
more common in rural villages of developing countries.
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2.1 Joint liability
Under joint liability, the group can access future loans only if it repays 2B. Consider the
following \no strategic default" action prole. When the group has sucient income, that is,
gi+ gj  2B, it repays 2B in any of the following ways: (a) if both borrowers have sucient
income, they repay B each; (b) if one of them, say j, has insucient income, then j repays
partly by contributing what she has, and i shoulders for her by repaying the decit. In other
words, (a) if gi; gj  B, then ri = B; (b) if gj < B < gi and gi + gj  2B, then ri = B,
rj = gj, and di = B gj. When the group does not have sucient income, gi+gj < 2B, then
there are no prospects of repaying 2B and hence, both i and j choose to default. Referring
to this action as C, the action prole (C;C) corresponds to the case of no strategic default
with risk-sharing.10
This action prole involves consideration of the following four cases separately: (i) gi; gj 
B; (ii) gj < B < gi and gi+gj  2B; (iii) gi < B < gj and gi+gj  2B; and (iv) gi+gj < 2B.
In case (i), ri = rj = B while di = dj = 0. In case (ii), ri = B, rj = gj, and di = B   gj,
resulting in ai = 2B   gj. Case (iii) is the other way around and ri = gi, leaving i zero
payo. In these three cases, the borrowers are eligible to receive further loans. In case (iv),
ri = rj = 0, with no future loans. Let p1; p2; p3; p4 be the probabilities of cases (i) to (iv),
respectively, where p2 = p3.
The borrower's expected payo from playing (C;C) in every period under joint liability
can be expressed as follows:
EV J;CC =
1
1  (p1 + 2p2) [E(g)  (p1 + 2p2)B]: (1)
To derive the condition under which the action prole (C;C) is supported in a subgame
perfect equilibrium (SPE), we consider a trigger strategy prole J in which borrowers play
(C;C) as long as no deviation occurs, switching to (D;D) for all periods after any deviation,
where D denotes the action of not repaying. We only need to examine the conditions for
which J has no protable one-shot deviation (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006).
To derive the conditions for no strategic default, we need to specify what would happen
if the group defaults. Let the amount borrower i shoulders for borrower j be di. The total
contribution of borrower i then becomes ai = ri + di. If the group defaults, borrower i will
lose ai where  2 [0; 1]. In reality, once a borrower repays ai to a MFI, it does not return
10One can think of other \risk-sharing" strategies that make consumption levels of both borrowers equal
whenever gi + gj  2B. But with risk neutrality, the payo from this strategy is the same as payo from
the action prole (C;C).
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the repaid amount ai in case the group defaults. This corresponds to  = 1. On the contrary,
Besley and Coate (1995) assumes that  = 0. This is likely in cases where the borrowers
interact beforehand to communicate their repayment decision and reach an agreement. Note
that once borrower i repays B, B is sunk when she decides on shouldering for her partner.
Now we briey state the incentive problems borrower i faces. First, consider case (i),
gi; gj  B. The payo from playing C is gi   B + EV J;CCi . Consider a one-shot deviation
in which the borrower repays B,  2 [0; 1). The most protable one-shot deviation would
be  > 0, since paying B can induce the partner to shoulder for borrower i by reducing the
amount the partner needs to shoulder for receiving the next loan. Given B is sunk when
borrower j decides on whether to shoulder or not, borrower j's incentive to shoulder is greater
when  is large. Moreover, borrower j will shoulder even if  = 0, if  is suciently large.
Expecting borrower j to shoulder, borrower i would choose to default if gj is suciently
large. This is an example of repayment decisions based on free-riding incentives.
On the contrary, in case (ii), gj < B < gi; gi + gj  2B, borrower i is required to
shoulder borrower j's decit, B   gi. Hence, if she decides to repay B, then she nally
needs to contribute 2B gj for obtaining further loans. This will discourage borrower i from
repaying if the value of gj is small. This is an example of how a negative shock to a group
member could induce the whole group to default, indicating a contagion problem.
The condition that the action prole (C,C) is sustained in a SPE in case (i) is as follows:
E(g)  B + 1  (p1 + 2p2)
2(p1 + 2p2)  1B (2)




otherwise. The analogous condition in case (ii) is as follows:
E[g]  B + [1  (p1 + 2p2)]B: (4)
While strictness of the conditions (4) and (2) depends on the value of , condition (4) is less
strict than condition (3). Larger the value of , more likely it is for (2  )B   E(g) < 0.
Furthermore, condition (4) becomes more strict than (2) if and only if  > 1  2(p1+2p2) 1
1 (p1+2p2) .
Hence, when the value of  is large, the binding incentive constraint is free-riding. If  is
small, contagion is the binding incentive constraint. It should be noted that if social sanctions




Under individual liability, borrower i can access future loans only if she repays her own
repayment amount B. However, there may still be an incentive to shoulder for the defaulting
partner, enabling access to future loans for the partner, anticipating shouldering in return
in the event of possible future investment failure.
First, we consider the repayment decision when there are no partners for sharing risk.




1  p [E(g)  pB] :
If a borrower with gi  B defaults strategically, then she will gain gi and receive zero payo
afterwards. Strategic default will not occur if and only if gi  B + EV I  gi, or
E(g)  B: (5)
This condition is less strict than those under joint liability, depicted in cases (2){(4).
Next, we consider the repayment decision under individual liability with voluntary risk
sharing. Consider the following \risk-sharing" action prole: (a) if both borrowers have
sucient income, each repays B; (b) if one of them, say j, has insucient income, but
the group as a whole has sucient income, then j partially contributes in repayment and i
shoulders di = B  gj; and (c) if the group as a whole has insucient income, the defaulting
members will not be shouldered. In other words, (a) if gi; gj  B, then ri = B; (b) if
gj < B < gi and gi + gj  2B, then ri = B, rj = gj, and di = B   gj; and (c) if gi  B but
gi + gj < 2B, then ri = B, rj = 0, and di = 0. We denote this action as C
0.
This action prole requires consideration of the following ve cases separately: (i)' gi; gj 
B; (ii)' gj < B  gi; gi + gj  2B; (iii)' gi < B < gj; gi + gj  2B;(iv)' gi + gj < 2B, gi  B;
and (v)' gi + gj < 2B, gi < B. The cases (i)' to (iii)' are equivalent to cases (i) to (iii)
under joint liability. Case (iv) of joint liability is divided into two subcases. Under joint
liability, once gi + gj < 2B, the game is over. However, under individual liability, even if
gi + gj < 2B, borrower i can still continue the game if gi  B, although her partner cannot.
Let probability of cases (iv)' and (v)' be p41 and p42, respectively, where p41 + p42 = p4.
Additionally, note that p  Pr(g  B) = p1 + p2 + p41.




1  (p1 + 2p2)
1
1  p f[1  (p1 + 2p2)]E(g)  (1  p)(p1 + 2p2)B   p41Bg : (6)
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In case of perfect monitoring, individual liability is free from the problems of free-riding
and contagion. First, consider case (i)', gi; gj  B, and a one-shot deviation in which i
repays B,  < 1. Under individual liability, as long as she repays her own loan, j can
obtain future loans, even if j does not shoulder for i. Hence, j has no incentive to shoulder
for the deviating partner. The condition for no protable one-shot deviation turns out to be
E(g)  B.
Next, consider case (ii)', gj < B < gi; gi + gj  2B. In this case, borrower i can
access future loans even if she does not shoulder for j. The condition for repayment without
shouldering for j is again E(g)  B. Hence, contagion will not occur.
Under joint liability, risk-sharing among borrowers is less likely than joint liability. The
condition for the risk-sharing arrangement to be self-sustained is as follows:
E[g]  B + 1  p
p2
[1  (p1 + 2p2)]B; (7)
which is more strict than conditions (2){(4) under joint liability.
2.3 Imperfect Public Monitoring
We do not provide a model for repayment decision under imperfect monitoring and just
underline the following observations.
First, borrowers cannot distinguish between strategic default and non-strategic default
perfectly only by observing partners' signal. Both under joint liability and individual liability,
borrowers might choose to strategically default expecting their partners to consider the
default as a consequence of insucient income instead, especially when the signal indicates
low-income status. Hence, introducing imperfect monitoring would increase the incentive for
free-riding both under joint liability and individual liability.
We believe that imperfect information is common even in rural villages. Although group
members are well informed about partner incomes, they may usually have some signals
on their income, rather than perfect information. As already observed, this may lead to




To investigate repayment decision, we use data from framed eld experiments11 conducted
in four rural villages in the Quang Ngai Province, one of the poorest provinces in Vietnam,
over a two-month period in August{September 2008.
Games conducted as part of the experiment were based on the repeated game structure.
Random groups were formed consisting of two or six players each. In each round, the
subjects received loans to earn stochastic incomes gi, and decided whether to repay B or not
after observing own income and signal of partner incomes. If some members in the group
did not repay their own loans, the other members were asked to shoulder for them. As
the contingent renewal condition was operational, defaulting individuals (under individual
liability) or groups (under joint liability) were not allowed to advance to further rounds
in the game. Moreover, points earned in previous rounds could not be used to repay the
current loan. To mimic the innite horizon games with discount factor , we introduced the
random stopping rule, wherein irrespective of subject choice, the game would end with the
probability of 1/6, that is,  = 5=6.12 After one game nished, the groups were reshued
for the next game.
The experiments were conducted by using cards. At the beginning of the round, each
subject received an envelope with three cards, representing \income." A card was either
for 10 points or 0 points, and the three cards combined to a total of two 10 points cards
and one 0 points card (20 points in total), one 10 points card and two 0 points cards (10
points in total), or no 10 points card and three 0 points cards (0 points in total). Hence,
income g took three possible values: g 2 f0; 10; 20g. For the distribution of gi, we conducted
three treatments by letting q = (q20; q10; q0) where qg = Pr(gi = g), g = 0; 10; 20, (i)
q = (30; 65; 5), (ii) q = (50; 25; 25), and (iii) q = (60; 20; 20). On applying these parameter
values to our theoretical model assuming perfect monitoring, the model predicts no strategic
default under individual liability and occurrence of strategic default, irrespective of the value
of , under joint liability. We set  = 1 corresponding to the situation that a MFI would
not return the amount (partially) repaid in case of default. Furthermore, communication
11This terminology was introduced by Harrison and List (2004).
12Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (2006) conducted nite horizon games, in which case choosing strategic
default is only the equilibrium. In each round, our research assistants rolled a die and if the die cast one,
the game was terminated even if the players repaid their loans.
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between the group members was allowed in some games. Since we did not nd any signicant
dierence in subject decisions across the distribution and communication treatments, we pool
observations across communication and distribution treatments in the following analysis.
After receiving the envelope, subjects simultaneously communicated their repayment
decision by submitting a card face down. Submitting a 10 point card indicated repayment
and submitting a 0 point card implied no repayment. Repayment decisions were made face-
to-face to resemble actual microcredit programs where group members usually know each
other and publicly repay at regular meetings. Members were then asked to shoulder for
defaulting members by submitting a 10 point card on their behalf.
To avoid any negative inuence that the experimental games may have on the social
relationship among the subjects, we introduced noisy income signals to ensure the subjects
do not have perfect information about other members' decisions. The signals were written on
the envelope, and although members could not observe partner incomes, they could observe
the signals on the envelope. Every time we distributed the envelope, we reminded the
subjects that the numbers on the envelope are signals associated with the income contained
in the envelopes, and stressed on the precision of the signal. This particular aspect of the
experiment was guided by the belief that actual microcredit borrowers cannot have perfect
information about incomes of their partners and hence, this setting may be considered a
good simulation of actual microcredit nancing.
The following analysis focuses on two dimensions of the treatments.
Individual Lending vs. Joint Liability In the individual lending treatment, a subject
would continue playing only if he/she repays his/her own loan (and the die does not cast
one). In the joint liability treatment, a subject would continue playing only if the group as
a whole repaid the total group loan amount.
Precision of the Signal To evaluate the importance of signal precision, we conducted
two signal precision treatments: 75% precision and 90% precision. More precise signal will
give more precise information about whether the default was strategic or not, which will in
turn aect the strategic default decision making.
Our focus is on studying the impact of partner income signals on repayment decision
under joint liability and individual liability. Contagion predicts that if the signal indicates
high realized income for the partner, a borrower will choose not to default strategically
since she need not shoulder for her partner. On the contrary, free-riding predicts that
11
signals indicating high partner income will oer the borrower free-riding incentives. We
will investigate the distinction in response to signals between joint liability and individual
liability, and precise signal and less precise signal.
3.2 Recruitment of the Subjects
We set up our lab in the local community oce and instructed the village ocials to re-
cruit subjects for our experiment from poor households who are likely to be the target of
governmental loans.13 We collected 360 subjects through this process.
Twelve subjects joined per session. When the subjects came to our lab, we conducted a
series of experimental games, followed by a questionnaire survey.14 All rules regarding the
experimental games were explained by using large poster boards before each game started.15
Games to be played were randomly assigned. The survey and experiment took two and a
half hours to complete, with an average payout of 100,000 VND (approximately 6.2 USD),
which was much higher than the urban experiment as it covered the transportation costs
involved in travelling from the villages to the lab. Every 10 points were converted to 1,000
VND. The payment was made at the end of the session.
After collecting the data, we found that some subjects did not satisfy the criteria of mi-
crocredit clients in that they were either too young or too old, or too educated. We excluded
subjects aged less than 18 or more than 65 and subjects with tertiary level education. That
left us with 347 valid subjects.
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of subjects used in our analysis. The rst column
presents the average characteristics of all the subjects that participated in the rural experi-
ment. Rest of the columns report the weighted average of the characteristics of subjects who
played each treatment. Since a subject played multiple individual or joint liability games,
the observations reported below exceed the total number of subjects. Subject characteristics
13Government of Vietnam provides loans to poor households through the Agribank and the Vietnam
Bank as part of its social policies. Their clients are similar to those of typical microcredit programs with the
exception that the Agribank mainly provides agricultural loans repayable on harvesting.
14Though there is a possibility that the game outcomes might aect the answers to the questionnaire,
we chose this order so that we could calculate the reward for each subject during the questionnaire survey.
Conducting experiments followed by questionnaire survey is a standard procedure followed in lab experiments
because they address the possibility of some questions in the questionnaire survey being aected by decisions
in the experimental game.
15Appendix Figure presents the contents of the poster boards used for explaining rules of the joint liability
games and individual liability games.
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are well balanced across the treatments and we found no statistically signicant dierences
in demographic variables across the treatments.
Table 1: Summary of subject statistics across treatments
Rural experiment Total IL JL 75% signal 90% signal
Female 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.43
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Age 41.86 41.49 41.71 41.30 41.76
(10.80) (10.75) (10.88) (10.69) (10.88)
Education 7.50 7.60 7.44 7.52 7.52
(3.07) (3.08) (3.04) (3.10) (3.04)
Married 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.92
(0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.29) (0.27)
Risky Choice 2.68 2.68 2.66 2.69 2.66
(1.42) (1.44) (1.39) (1.40) (1.42)
GSS 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
(0.34) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33)
Cooperate 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.81 1.80
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.33)
Observations 347 766 734 560 994
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
4 Empirical Strategy
There is ample heterogeneity across individuals in terms of their propensity to strategically
default. To control for individual heterogeneity, we estimate the xed eect linear probability
model specied as follows:16
Pr(yikt = 1) = Tik + Sikt + TikSikt + ci + k + t + ikt; (8)
16Although probit or logit models are popular binary choice models, xed eect probit is inconsistent.
Fixed eect logit can produce consistent estimates, but with many categorical variables, and the iteration
often does not converge.
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where ci represents the time-invariant individual eects, which depict the psychological un-
willingness against strategic default and risk attitude, k is the session order eect, t is the
round eect, and ikt depicts the remaining unobserved factors. Tik is an indicator for joint
liability and Sikt denotes the signal contents. We run this regression separately for observa-
tions from the 75% and 90% precision signal treatments. The standard errors are clustered
by sessions to allow for correlation between subjects in the same session.
We distinguish free-riding from contagion based on the response to the signal contents,
Sikt, especially signals indicating high partner incomes. Free-riding implies more strategic
default and contagion implies less strategic default in response to signals indicating high
partner incomes. In addition to signals indicating high incomes (good signals), we also
include signals indicating low partner incomes (bad signals). In the two-member group
treatment, we dene a signal to be good (bad) if the signal value is 20 (0). In the six-member
group treatment, we dene a signal to be good (bad) if the average value of the signals is
not less than 12 (not greater than 8). A signal average of 12 indicates that the group has
sucient total income to shoulder a defaulting member, if the signals are correct. A signal
average of 8 indicates absence of any prospects for repaying the group loan, if the signals
are correct. Similar results are observed on using dierent cuto values. In Appendix Table
1, we report the results of partner signals by dening signals as good (bad) if the average
signal is no less than 14 (no greater than 6) or 16 (no greater than 4) in the six-member
group treatment.  reects the dierence in responses to signal contents under joint liability
and individual liability, and the linear combination of  and  capture the response to signal
contents under joint liability, which is of primary interest to us. Note that free-riding can
occur under individual liability in case of imperfect monitoring. This is captured by .
Our experimental design with contingent renewal gives rise to the econometric problem
of attrition. Since defaulted individuals or groups could not continue in the game, we only
observe the selected samples and attempt to minimize the attrition problem by restricting
our sample to observations of the rst four rounds only. We nd that the results are robust
to the change in this restriction.17 Moreover, given the relatively low default rate in our
games, it appears that the sample selection problem may not be too critical.
To conrm that the sample selection problem is not signicant in our case, we also report
the results using inverse probability weighting (IPW) (Robins, Rotnitzky, and Zhao, 1995;
Wooldridge, 2010) and assess if they are similar. The IPW allows for any correlation between
the variable predicting the sample selection, say zikt, and the error term ikt, but requires
17The results are available upon request.
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the following conditions:
Pr(sikt = 1jzik1; : : : ; zikt; ik1; : : : ; ikt; si;t 1 = 1) = Pr(sikt = 1jzikt; si;t 1 = 1); (9)
Pr(sikt = 1jzikt; si;t 1 = 1) > 0 for every value of zikt. (10)
The IPW weights each observation by the inverse of Pr(sikt = 1jzikt; si;t 1 = 1). However,
since the individuals or groups who default cannot play the following rounds, Pr(sikt =
1jzikt; si;t 1 = 1) would be zero for certain values of (yik;t 1;xik;t 1), violating condition (10).
To avoid Pr(sikt = 1jzikt; si;t 1 = 1) being zero, we restrict zikt to own repayment decision,
own income, and the sum of partner incomes. Excluding the partner's repayment decision
will invalidate our assumption (9), but we expect that the IPW will correct for sample
selection to some extent.18
5 Results
5.1 Strategic Default
Table 2 summarizes the number of sessions and observations across the treatments. In total,
we have 130 sessions, out of which 64 are joint liability sessions and 83 sessions are conducted
with 90% precision signal. Since we set the probability of playing games with 75% precision
signal as half the probability of playing with 90% precision signal games, the 75% precision
signal treatment has smaller number of observations.
Moreover, since we investigate responses to partner signals, we only use the observations
in which the partners are also playing the game. This excludes observations in the individual
18There are at least two other econometric procedures to correct for sample selection: Heckman-type
procedure and bound analysis. Heckman-type procedure exploits the excluded variables, which determine
sample selection but do not have direct impact on y. However, since strategy is in general a function of past
variables and actions in a repeated game, any variable aecting attrition (e.g., own and partner incomes)
could directly aect strategic default decision. Furthermore, even if we are willing to assume that past
incomes do not directly aect current y, that only captures the sources of attrition (b) in the text and the
estimator will not correct for sample selection bias caused by (c). The bound analysis proposed by Lee
(2009) employs the trimming procedure, which provides the upper and lower bound on average treatment
eects and requires neither the exclusion restrictions nor the conditions required for the IPW. However,
this procedure does require the monotonicity assumption: the treatment assignment can only aect sample
selection in \one direction" for all individuals. In our setting, this would require joint liability, for instance, to
aect sample selection in the same direction for all individuals. This condition does not allow some subjects
under joint liability to be more likely to default due to strategic default, and others to be less likely because
of risk-sharing within the group.
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liability game where the partners defaulted and did not proceed in the game. This restriction
makes joint liability and individual liability comparable because the players could potentially
share income risk with their partners in both these treatments. This restriction leaves us
with 3,662 round-level observations.
Table 2: Type of games
sessions observations
observation
with g  B default rate
% of strategic default
(standard deviation)
Individual liability (IL) 66 1871 1588 0.198 0.055 (0.229)
Joint liability (JL) 64 1791 1547 0.197 0.070 (0.256)
75% signal precision 47 1283 1060 0.217 0.052 (0.224)
90% signal precision 83 2379 2075 0.187 0.068 (0.252)
Total 130 3662 3135 0.198 0.063 (0.243)
We dene strategic default as no repayment when the subject, in reality, has enough
income to repay, that is, g  B. However, with zero or inadequate income, the subject has
no choice but to default. Excluding these observations, we are left with 3,135 observations.
The average ratio of strategic default is 6.3%. Low frequency of strategic default results in
low variations in yikt. Hence, estimations using some subsample will suer from relatively
large standard errors. The overall default rate is 19.8%, which is rather high compared to
most microcredit programs. This might be caused because in our experimental games, risk-
sharing occurs among borrowers only within the group, whereas in reality people have much
wider risk-sharing networks.19
Table 3 examines how repayment decisions dier across the treatments by regressing
strategic default on joint liability (JL); 75% precision signal treatment (75% signal); and
an indicator for income of 20 points, the maximum investment return. Individual xed
eects, round eects, and session order eects are all controlled. Column (1) shows no
signicant dierence in repayment decisions across the treatments. However, the interaction
of signal treatment variable with joint liability reveals that joint liability increases strategic
default when the signal is noisy, as shown in Column (3). The linear combination suggests
that joint liability increased strategic default by 8.3 percentage points in the noisy signal
treatment (p < 0:01). High income (income of 20 points) is always signicantly positive at
19Another possibility is that actual distribution of investment returns is safer than our experimental
distribution. In the income distribution treatment of q = (30; 65; 5), the default rate was much lower at
0.13.
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1 percent levels across these specications and this eect is somewhat stronger under joint
liability. Columns (2) and (4) report the results using IPW, showing little change in the
coecients. Hence, we need not worry about sample selection and hereafter, report results
using the xed eect linear probability model.
Table 3: Strategic default
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE IPW FE IPW
JL 0.012 0.019 0.009 0.019
(0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021)
75% signal 0.002 0.006 -0.041 -0.039
(0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.023)
income=20 -0.082 -0.086 -0.062 -0.062
(0.014) (0.022) (0.015) (0.021)
JL 75% signal 0.074 0.076
(0.022) (0.028)
JL income=20 -0.039 -0.046
(0.023) (0.030)
Observations 3135 2874 3135 2874
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
5.2 Contagion vs. Free-Riding
We now investigate our main research question: free-riding and contagion under joint liabil-
ity. Contagion implies more strategic default when the signal indicates low partner income
(bad signal), and strategic default when the signal indicates good partner income.20 On
the contrary, free-riding predicts more strategic default when the partner's signal is good.
Free-riding can also occur under individual liability in the case of imperfect monitoring.
20When we assume risk-neutral borrowers, own income will not aect the repayment decision given partner
income is xed. But if borrowers are risk-averse, higher own income will increase the incentive to repay,
which is consistent with the signicantly positive coecient on high income in Table 3.
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Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 report our baseline results for 75% and 90% precision
signal treatment, respectively. Good signal of partner is denoted by p:signal good. Here-
after, usage of the prex p: in the tables indicates the partner's variable. In 75% precision
signal treatment, the partner's good signal did not aect the decision to strategically default.
The coecients are close to zero, and there is no dierence between response to the part-
ner's good signal under individual liability and joint liability. This is plausible because the
signals were not precise enough for the subjects to rely on. Interestingly, the partner's bad
signal reduced strategic default under individual liability by 3.6 percentage points, which
is signicant at 10 percent level. On the contrary, in 90% precision signal treatment, we
nd a signicant dierence in the response to the partner's good signal. Compared to in-
dividual liability, the subjects under joint liability were more likely to default strategically
when the partner's signal was good. The linear combination of the partner's good signal
and its interaction term with joint liability is positive, which is consistent with free-riding,
although marginally insignicant (p = 0:106). The negative but insignicant coecient of
the partner's good signal indicates no free-riding behavior under individual liability. Ob-
servations reveal that the partner's bad signal does not inuence repayment decision under
joint liability and individual liability. The results provide weak evidence for free-riding and
no supporting evidence for contagion.
One may be concerned that the positive coecient of the partner's good signal captures
risk-sharing arrangements among group members in cases where a member with higher
income transfers certain amount to a partner with lower income. Given the borrowers can
receive transfers only when they do not repay and the partner shoulders for them in our game,
the only way to receive transfers is to strategically default. We control for the risk-sharing
eects by including the partner's default in the last round,21 or the cumulative balance of
the borrower, which is dened as the number of times of shouldering (providing transfers)
subtracted by number of times of being helped (receiving transfers) up to that round. Their
interaction terms with joint liability and an indicator for the partner's good signal are also
included. Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002) demonstrated that current transfers depend
on the history of transfers and increase the scope for risk-sharing. We hope that inclusion
of the past default or cumulative balance would control for the risk-sharing eect.
Note that including these variables forces us to use observations from round two onwards,
resulting in samples dierent than those in Columns (1) and (2). Hence, we report the results
21In the six-member group treatment, this variable takes the value one if any partner does not repay in
the last round.
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Table 4: Strategic default: contagion vs. free-riding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
75% sig 90% sig 75% sig 90% sig 75% sig 90% sig 75% sig 90% sig
p: signal good -0.004 -0.028 -0.008 -0.047 -0.010 -0.050 -0.008 -0.055
(0.017) (0.018) (0.039) (0.019) (0.038) (0.019) (0.036) (0.019)
JL p: signal good 0.001 0.057 0.017 0.107 0.017 0.109 0.036 0.098
(0.030) (0.025) (0.061) (0.031) (0.060) (0.031) (0.058) (0.030)
p: signal bad -0.036 -0.027 -0.005 -0.010 -0.006 -0.010 0.004 0.064
(0.021) (0.031) (0.024) (0.040) (0.024) (0.039) (0.028) (0.051)
JL p: signal bad 0.035 0.026 0.052 0.080 0.083 0.072 0.100 0.031
(0.053) (0.043) (0.067) (0.060) (0.069) (0.058) (0.077) (0.086)
p: default (t-1) No No No No Yes Yes No No
Cumulative balance No No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1060 2075 613 1223 613 1223 613 1223
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
of the regressions in Columns (3) and (4), using observations from round two onwards. The
results are similar to those in Columns (1) and (2). In case of the 90% precision signal
treatment, depicted in Column (4), the coecients of the partner's good signal and its
interaction term with joint ability are still signicant, and their linear combination becomes
signicantly positive (p = 0:013). This change in the signicance level might reect that
once they repaid the loans in the rst round, the borrower's belief in the partner's propensity
to repay would strengthen. Moreover, since a borrower can free-ride only when the partner
repays the loan, this belief would make the borrower more responsive to the partner's good
signal.
Columns (5) and (6) report the results on inclusion of an indicator for the partner's default
in the last round and its interaction term with the partner's good signal. These variables also
interact with joint liability. The results are quite similar with those in Columns (3) and (4),
and all of these newly added interaction terms are insignicant. In Column (6), the linear
combination of the partner's good signal and its interaction term with joint liability is 0.059,
with p-value of 0.014. In Columns (7) and (8), we include the cumulative balance of the
borrower, and its interaction terms with the partner's good signal and joint liability. These
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interaction terms are insignicant, and the linear combination of the partner's good signal
and its interaction term with joint liability is signicant at 10 percent level (p = 0:067). The
coecients of the partner's bad signal and its interaction term with joint liability are not
signicant in any specication. Overall, the observed patterns are consistent with free-riding
and there is little evidence supporting contagion.
In Appendix Table 2, we have added indicator variables for own signal contents. The
reference category is the signal indicating 10 points. Adding these variables has little eect
on the coecients of the partner's signal contents, since own signal contents and the partner's
signal contents are independent.22
5.3 Response to Free-riding
Now we examine how the subjects responded to partner defaults and the seemingly free-
riding behavior. Note that in the case of contagion, the entire group would default and
hence, at no stage shouldering decisions for other members need to be made and there are
no future rounds. Since the subjects could only observe the signals and could not precisely
know if the partners defaulted strategically or not, we investigate the eect of the partner's
seemingly strategic defaulting tendency, that is, defaults in cases when the partner's signal
indicates availability of sucient income to repay.
First, we investigate the likelihood of other members choosing to shoulder for the seem-
ingly strategically defaulting partners. Table 5 reports the estimation results after including
indicator variables for seemingly strategic defaulting members, that is, default by partners
in cases where the signal was no less than 10, p:sig10& default. Since subjects with
sucient income (i.e., 20 points) faced the decision to shoulder when some other members
defaulted, only these select observations are used for analysis in this case. However, as long
as players defaulted strategically expecting their partners to shoulder for them, and on an
22In case of the 95% precision signal, own bad signal (the signal indicating own income is zero) results
in more strategic default. This may be caused because one can disguise strategic default as non-strategic
default with own bad signal. This implies free-riding. However, one may argue that this reects contagion, as
borrower i's bad signal would induce the partner to default for avoiding high repayment burden. Moreover,
borrower i, expecting this possibility, could choose to default. Additionally, note that the incentive to free-
ride is highest with own bad signal and the partner's good signal, and that the incentive to collude is highest
with own and partner's bad signals. Columns (3) and (4) report the regression results, including (i) own
bad signal with partner's good signal, and (ii) own bad signal with partner's bad signal. These terms and
their interaction terms with joint liability never become signicant, probably due to the small sample size
satisfying (i) or (ii).
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average, this expectation is correct, the estimated coecients would underestimate the true
eects and hence, provide lower bounds.
In Columns (1) and (2), we only include the treatment variables. Despite the fact that
we set  = 1, joint liability reduces the likelihood of shouldering in the 75% precision signal
treatment case, instead of increasing it. Although joint liability has positive eect in the
90% precision signal treatment case, its eect is not signicant. With less precise signals,
joint liability does not necessarily induce risk-sharing among group members.
Table 5: Response to partner's default: Shouldering for other members
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
75% sig 90% sig 75% sig 90% sig 75% sig 90% sig
JL -0.246 0.157 -0.313 0.174 -0.322 0.162
(0.132) (0.122) (0.141) (0.155) (0.144) (0.157)
p:sig 10& default -0.010 0.065 -0.087 0.051
(0.100) (0.083) (0.129) (0.111)
JL (p:sig 10& default) 0.154 0.001 0.296 0.060
(0.187) (0.147) (0.200) (0.172)
p:sig= 20 & default 0.108 0.037
(0.163) (0.142)
JL (p:sig= 20 & default) -0.238 -0.103
(0.237) (0.187)
Observations 245 378 245 378 245 378
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Columns (3) and (4) report the coecients of variables indicating the partner's seemingly
strategic defaulting tendency and its interaction terms with joint liability. The coecients of
these variables turn out to be insignicant in both 75% and 90% precision signal treatment
cases. In this specication, the coecient of joint liability captures the eect of default when
the partner's signal is bad. The point estimate implies that when the partners defaulted
with bad signals in case of the 75% precision signal treatment, the subjects were less likely
to shoulder for them. Hence, we again observe that joint liability does not necessarily
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induce risk-sharing among group members if the signals are not so precise.23 In Columns
(5) and (6), we add another indicator variable for the partner's default when the partner's
signal indicated 20 point income, p:sig=20& default. However, neither this term nor its
interaction term with joint liability is signicant and the results do not change.
Overall, the decision regarding whether to shoulder or not does not depend on whether
partners defaulted strategically or not. This is still consistent with the trigger strategy
where the punishment occurs in the next round since it would be optimal for the remaining
borrowers to shoulder in order to obtain further loans given the sunk cost.24
Next, we examine how the seemingly strategic defaulting tendency aects future repay-
ment decisions. In Columns (1) to (2) in Table 6, we include the partner's default in the last
round. The results indicate that the partner's default aected the future repayment decision
under joint liability only in the 75% signal treatment case. On the contrary, in case of the
90%-precision signal, partner's default in the previous round did not aect the repayment
decision.
Columns (3) and (4) investigate whether the partner's seemingly strategic defaulting be-
havior aected the future repayment decision. The results show that dependence on past
defaults in the 75% precision signal case observed in Column (1) is driven by the response to
the seemingly strategic defaulting tendency. Under individual lending, the partner's seem-
ingly strategic defaulting tendency in the last round did not aect the repayment decision.
On the contrary, the seemingly strategic defaulting behavior did not signicantly aect the
partner's future repayment decision in the 90% precision signal treatment case. This might
justify choosing free-riding under joint liability in case of the 90% precision signal treatment
because choosing strategic default would not trigger the partner to strategically default in
the future. In Columns (5) and (6), we add an indicator variable which takes the value one
if the partner's signal was 20 but she defaulted in the last round. Response to the part-
ner's seemingly strategic defaulting tendency is concentrated on the case where the partners
defaulted despite the signal indicating 20 point income in the 75% precision signal treat-
23It is also possible that it reects the fact that subjects who defaulted with bad signals under joint liability
were dierent from those who defaulted with bad signals under individual liability. We do not elaborate on
the sample selection problem in this paper, because as we stated in the empirical strategy section, there are
no valid ways to correct for sample selection in our experiment. Moreover, the number of observations used
for assessing shouldering behavior is quite small.
24On using the ratio of partners who defaulted strategically, we nd that subjects tend to shoulder for
their partners when more partners defaulted strategically under joint liability. This result is driven by the
fact that more members are required to shoulder as more partners chose to default.
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ment case. We still do not nd any response to the partner's seemingly strategic defaulting
tendency in the 90% precision signal treatment case, perhaps because of the accuracy of
monitoring technology, which enables a player to induce the other partner to choose to act
in a more cooperative manner by using a milder punishment (Matsushima, Tanaka, and
Toyama, 2013).
Table 6: Response to partner's default: Future repayment decision
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
75% sig 90% sig 75% sig 90% sig 75% sig 90% sig
JL 0.006 -0.010 0.005 -0.011 0.009 -0.012
(0.054) (0.021) (0.054) (0.021) (0.053) (0.021)
p:default(t-1) -0.027 0.018 -0.024 0.011 -0.024 0.010
(0.025) (0.027) (0.031) (0.035) (0.032) (0.035)
JL (p:default(t-1)) 0.131 0.006 0.020 -0.032 0.016 -0.033
(0.056) (0.043) (0.051) (0.046) (0.051) (0.046)
p:sig 10& default(t-1) -0.006 0.012 0.018 0.018
(0.029) (0.046) (0.055) (0.055)
JL (p:sig 10& default(t-1)) 0.174 0.073 0.039 0.109
(0.066) (0.068) (0.085) (0.098)
p:sig= 20 & default(t-1) -0.033 -0.010
(0.046) (0.065)
JL (p:sig= 20 & default(t-1)) 0.207 -0.058
(0.108) (0.109)
Observations 1060 2075 1060 2075 1060 2075
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
6 Concluding Remarks
Although joint liability schemes are widely adopted by microcredit programs, economic the-
ory suggests that joint liability could increase strategic default through contagion and free-
riding. Individual liability could also give rise to the free-riding problem under imperfect
monitoring, although it would be free from contagion. By using experimental repayment
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games with noisy signals, which mimic actual microcredit programs, we found that subjects
indeed have the tendency to free-ride under joint liability. While most empirical research has
focused on the problem of contagion under joint liability, our results suggest the importance
of investigating the free-riding behavior. We did not nd any evidence for free-riding under
individual liability. In all such cases, the decision of shouldering for partners and repayment
in future rounds did not respond to the partner's seemingly strategic defaulting tendency,
especially in case of the precise signal treatment. This may explain why subjects chose the
free-riding option.
It should be noted that the incentive for free-riding largely depends on the parameter ,
the sunk portion of the repayment, while making the shouldering decision. In the experi-
ment, we set  = 1, although this might not reect the actual situation in some settings.
However, this indicates that free-riding can be prevented by carefully designing microcre-
dit contracts. Encouraging communication before repayment could resolve the free-riding
problem, although it could increase chances of contagion. This suggests the imperative of
analyzing the free-riding and the contagion problems simultaneously, and not separately, in
joint liability programs, since a policy aiming to reduce free-riding may increase contagion.
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Table 1: Strategic default: using other threshold value for partner's good and bad signals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
75% sig 90% sig 75% sig 90% sig 75% sig 90% sig 75% sig 90% sig
JL 0.005 -0.030 -0.010 -0.031 -0.070 -0.025 -0.084 -0.035
(0.058) (0.026) (0.056) (0.025) (0.156) (0.031) (0.152) (0.029)
p: signal good -0.003 -0.029 -0.016 -0.022 -0.022 -0.048 -0.030 -0.051
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.033) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018)
JL p: signal good 0.003 0.044 0.023 0.043 0.046 0.073 0.064 0.088
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.048) (0.030) (0.049) (0.029)
p: signal bad -0.025 -0.019 -0.037 -0.029 0.016 0.067 0.005 0.040
(0.021) (0.034) (0.022) (0.031) (0.039) (0.059) (0.040) (0.061)
JL p: signal bad 0.038 0.012 0.058 0.029 0.084 0.027 0.103 0.061
(0.053) (0.046) (0.053) (0.044) (0.083) (0.096) (0.089) (0.103)
Observations 1060 2075 1060 2075 613 1223 613 1223
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 2: Strategic default: contagion vs. free-riding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
75% sig 90% sig 75% sig 90% sig 75% sig 90% sig
p: signal good -0.005 -0.027 -0.008 -0.029 -0.009 -0.048
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.038) (0.019)
JL p: signal good -0.000 0.057 0.002 0.060 -0.004 0.108
(0.029) (0.025) (0.028) (0.027) (0.057) (0.030)
p: signal bad -0.037 -0.028 -0.032 -0.021 -0.002 -0.013
(0.021) (0.031) (0.020) (0.032) (0.027) (0.039)
JL p: signal bad 0.023 0.027 -0.003 0.027 0.049 0.077
(0.050) (0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.064) (0.058)
own signal=0 0.014 -0.095 -0.022 -0.138 -0.018 -0.043
(0.029) (0.043) (0.057) (0.067) (0.040) (0.049)
JL own signal=0 0.052 0.181 0.059 0.231 0.099 0.100
(0.082) (0.076) (0.125) (0.117) (0.106) (0.105)
own signal=20 0.026 0.014 0.029 0.016 -0.009 -0.029
(0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.037) (0.036)
JL own signal=20 -0.101 -0.018 -0.100 -0.018 -0.105 -0.026
(0.045) (0.030) (0.045) (0.030) (0.063) (0.035)
own signal=0 & p: signal good 0.063 0.104
(0.078) (0.072)
JL (own signal=0 & p: signal good) -0.068 -0.081
(0.157) (0.180)
own signal=0 & p: signal bad 0.015 -0.156
(0.076) (0.116)
JL (own signal=0 & p: signal bad) 0.208 0.024
(0.230) (0.153)
partner(P) default(t-1) 0.008 0.101
(0.041) (0.067)
JL P default(t-1) 0.151 -0.041
(0.069) (0.087)
p: signal good default(t-1) -0.021 -0.036
(0.056) (0.139)
JL (p: signal good default(t-1)) -0.204 0.144
(0.090) (0.219)
Observations 1060 2075 1060 2075 613 1223
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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